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Plaintiffs, by their attorney, Carl E. Person, as and for their complaint (the "complaint"), respectfully allege:

JURISDICTION

1. This controversy involves 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 (deprivation of civil rights), 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1981 (equal rights under law), 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201-2202 (declaratory judgment action), 18 U.S.C. Section 1951 (the "Hobbs Act", obtaining property through extortion under color of official right), and provisions of the United States Constitution: 1st Amendment (right to petition for redress); 6th Amendment (right to fair trial); 14th Amendment, Section 1 (abridging privileges and immunities; depriving of liberty and property without due process; and denial of equal protection of laws); Constitution Art. I, Section 8, Cl. 3 (impermissible burden on interstate commerce); and 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. Section 1337 (commerce), 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (civil rights).

2. This Court has original jurisdiction over the (i) federal question claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331; (ii) commerce claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1337; and (iii) civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1343, as hereinafter more fully appears.

3. Each of the defendants (other than xxxxx XWxxxxxxxxx) is an individual residing in the State of New York, Eastern District of New York, or is a local state agency or official thereof with offices in the State of New York, Eastern District of New York, and this Court has personal jurisdiction over each of said defendants by reason of their presence in New York.

3A. This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant xxxx XWxxxxxxxxx under New York's long-arm provision, CPLR 302(a)(1,2,3).

4. Venue as to each of the defendants is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(1) (as a judicial district where any defendant resides) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(2) (a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred).

5. Plaintiffs also invoke the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to consider claims arising under New York law, as more fully set forth below.

6. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, M.D. ("Dxxxxxxxxx") resides at xxx X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx, and is the principal shareholder of plaintiffs XD2xxxxxxxxx Corporation, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress xxx, Inc., and XD3xxxxxxxxx

7. Plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx ("X2xxxxxxxxx") is the wife of Dxxxxxxxxx and resides with him at X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx.

8. Dxxxxxxxxx, together with his wife, X2xxxxxxxxx, are the parents and natural guardians of X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, age 13, and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., age 11, both living with Dxxxxxxxxx and X2xxxxxxxxx at X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx.

8A. Plaintiff X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx ("X3xxxxxxxxx") is the daughter of Dxxxxxxxxx and resides with him at X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx.

8B. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, xx. ("X4xxxxxxxxx") is the son of Dxxxxxxxxx and resides with him at X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx.

8C. Plaintiff X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx ("X4xxxxxxxxx") is the daughter of Dxxxxxxxxx and resides at xxx.

9. Plaintiff XD2xxxxxxxxx Corp. ("XD2xxxxxxxxx" or "XD2xxx") is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York in 1998; was put out of business by defendants' activities; and has its principal place of business at c/o X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, President, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx. Dxxxxxxxxx is the principal shareholder of XD2xxxxxxxxx.

10. From April 1, 1998 to the present, XD2xxxxxxxxx has been in the business of finding funders for corporate and commercial borrowers throughout the United States and assisting clients in capitalizing their businesses.

11. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxxaddress xxx, Inc. ("xxxx") is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York on October 29, 1999 and has its principal place of business at c/o X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, President, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx. Dxxxxxxxxx is the principal shareholder of xxxxx.

11A. From 1999 to the present, xxxxx has been a family asset-holding corporation without any business activities.

12. Plaintiff D3xxxxxx, Inc. ("D3xxxx") is a corporation organized under the laws of Texas on July 22, 1996 and has its principal place of business at c/o X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, President, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, NY xxxxx. Dxxxxxxxxx is the principal shareholder of XD3xxxxxxxxx.

12A. From the date XD3xxxxxxxxx was acquired by Dxxxxxxxxx (as owner of a yacht being purchased by Dxxxxxxxxx), xxxxx has been a family title-holding corporation without any business activities.

13. Defendant Sxxxxxxxxx ("Sxxxxxxxxx") resides in Sxx, Suffolk County, New York, and is employed as an assistant district attorney in defendant Office of the District Attorney of Suffolk County, at North County Complex - Building 77, Veterans Memorial Highway, Hauppauge NY 11788, and was hired and supervised by defendant James M. DA1xxxxxxxxx, Jr. until he was voted out of office during January, 2002.

14. Sxxxxxxxxx is sued in her individual and official capacity as assistant district attorney for Suffolk County from 2000 (or earlier) to the present.

15. Defendant xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ("DAXXXX") resides, upon information and belief, at XXXXXXXXXXXX, Suffolk County, New York XXXXX, and during the 1990's until early 2002 was a Suffolk County attorney and then was elected District Attorney of Suffolk County, with offices in Suffolk County.

16. DA1xxxxxxxxx is sued in his individual and official capacity as former District Attorney for Suffolk County from sometime during the early 1990's to the present.

16A. In 1994, DA1xxxxxxxxx was cited by the Suffolk County Legislature for "unusual prosecutorial behavior in the Office of the Suffolk County District Attorney, including threats against elected officials, public officials and private citizens which, if substantiated, could rise to the level of misfeasance, malfeasance, and/or non-feasance in office", and the Legislature by "RESOLUTION NO. 988 - 1994, REQUEST[ED] THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY" (see Exhibit A hereto).

17. Defendant DA4xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ("Oxxxxxxxxx") resides, upon information and belief, in Suffolk County, New York, and is employed as a detective for defendant Office of the District Attorney of Suffolk County, at North County Complex - Building 77, Veterans Memorial Highway, Hauppauge NY 11788, and was hired and supervised by DA1xxxxxxxxx until he was voted out of office during January 2002.

18. Oxxxxxxxxx is sued in her individual and official capacity as detective for Suffolk County from 2000 (or earlier) to the present.

19. Defendant Office of the District Attorney of Suffolk County, New York ("Suffolk County DA"), with offices at North County Complex - Building 77, Veterans Memorial Highway, Hauppauge NY 11788, was run by DA1xxxxxxxxx from sometime during the early 1990's to early 2002, and by elected official DA2xxxxxxxxx DA2xxxxxxxxx from early 2002 to the present, and is sued herein as a local governmental agency.

20. Defendant XXX XWxxxxxxxxx ("XWxxxxxxxxx") resides at XXXX Ave., XXX, XX XXXXX and has a place of business at xxx, a former customer of XD2xxxxxxxxx, and is sued herein in her individual capacity and as a complainant, informer and co-conspirator with the other defendants in their activities directed against plaintiffs, as hereinafter described, for the use of criminal proceedings by the other defendants against plaintiffs to punish Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx (and the other plaintiffs) for prevailing in their lawsuit against her for unpaid fees owed by her to XD2xxxxxxxxx.

21. Each defendant resides, maintains an office, transacts business, or is found within the Eastern District of New York, or (as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx) transacts business within New York, committed a tortious act in New York, or committed a tortious act without the state causing injury to plaintiffs within the state [and meets the requirements of CPLR 302(3)(i),(ii)].

22. The following definitions are used in this complaint:

A. "Plaintiffs" when used in a specific Count refers to the plaintiffs whose claims are set forth in the Count, unless stated to the contrary.

B. "Accused Plaintiffs" or "3 Accused Plaintiffs" refers to the three plaintiffs who have been accused of criminal conduct by the Prosecutor Defendants: X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, and XD2xxxxxxxxx.

C. "Prosecutor Defendants" refers to all of the defendants except XWxxxxxxxxx.

D. "Co-Conspirators" refers to each of the defendants, who are alleged to have conspired with each other and with complainant-defendant xxxx XWxxxxxxxxx and former Assistant District Attorney DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior A. DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior, and others who at this time are not known to plaintiffs.

23. Defendant XWxxxxxxxxx, having been sued by plaintiff XD2xxxxxxxxx for unpaid fees and having entered into a stipulation of settlement with XD2xxxxxxxxx, requested the other defendants to bring criminal proceedings against Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and other plaintiffs, in retaliation for the lawsuit against her settled in favor of XD2xxxxxxxxx; XWxxxxxxxxx agreed that XD2xxxxxxxxx had earned the fee charged by XD2xxxxxxxxx, and paid it as part of the settlement.

23A. XWxxxxxxxxx was represented by counsel in the action settled by her, and subsequently complained to the Suffolk County DA for vindictive and retaliatory purposes only, to create unjustified criminal proceedings against the Accused Plaintiffs.

24. Suffolk County DA under defendant DA1xxxxxxxxx was in the business of extorting money from selected persons in Suffolk by commencing criminal proceedings against them and simultaneously attaching substantially all of the defendants' real and personal property without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

24A. This was done for the purpose of preventing the defendants from obtaining skilled attorneys to fight the charges and recover the attached property; to coerce the defendants into settling the criminal charges by consenting to confiscation of the attached property; and accepting a plea with reduced jail time, in comparison to what the defendant could expect if required to defend himself without benefit of the real estate, business and other assets attached at the outset by defendant Suffolk County DA.

24B. After his landslide election victory in 2002, the new District Attorney DA2xxxxxxxxx DA2xxxxxxxxx was widely quoted as saying that "The quality of the investigations of the White Collar Crime Bureau under DA1xxxxxxxxx was sadly lacking."

25. XWxxxxxxxxx convinced the other defendants that plaintiffs had millions of dollars worth of property available for attachment, and defendants were seeking to attach property wherever possible because DA1xxxxxxxxx made personal use of part of the attached properties and provided economic benefits to the persons working under him to the extent they were able to attach property through coercion of the owners thereof into accepting guilty pleas (and loss of part or all of the attached property) as a way of resolving the criminal proceedings which generally would not be won by defendants without prosecutorial abuse including wrongful use of the New York attachment law, CPLR 3210-3252.

26. Defendants conspired to indict Dxxxxxxxxx alleged failure to locate financing for 100% of his customers, which indictment was based on wholly false information, and simultaneously defendants fraudulently attached all of plaintiffs' real estate (i.e., their home), bank accounts, leased cars, and other property, amounting to $3 million, and instantaneously turning Dxxxxxxxxx and his family into paupers, unable to afford the required legal representation to fight the Prosecutor Defendants' unlawful fraud, coercion and legal terrorism.

26A. The attachment was made without an impartial or reasonable investigation by the Prosecution Defendants who, if they had first communicated with Dxxxxxxxxx, would have learned (and received documents proving) that:

A.Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx had arranged for $128,000,000 in financing for a total of about 50 corporations and partnerships, not the lack of any fundings claimed by the Prosecution Defendants in their attachment papers;

B. Complainant XWxxxxxxxxx received the promised services from Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx but had lied in her financial submissions to them by falsely stating that she had a net worth much higher than her actual net worth (a $1,000,000 difference) and offered a bogus guarantor; and that the action by Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx against her, and her settlement of the action with Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx, were wholly justified by records;

C. Substantially all of the other complainants solicited by the Prosecutor Defendants, each of whom had been sued by XD2xxxxxxxxx or upon whom a demand for payment had been made, were in a position similar to XWxxxxxxxxx, in that XD2xxxxxxxxx's suit against them for unpaid fees were justified because XD2xxxxxxxxx had earned the fees;

D. XD2xxxxxxxxx never offered to fund customers from its own assets, and never prepared or used any financial statements for XD2xxxxxxxxx which suggested that XD2xxxxxxxxx was going to be the lender; and

E. XD2xxxxxxxxx's prospective customers were encouraged to speak to lengthy lists of XD2xxxxxxxxx's clients and former clients before getting involved with XD2xxxxxxxxx.

27. Dxxxxxxxxx suffered an angina pectoris attack within minutes after his arrest on January 16, 2001; and while Dxxxxxxxxx was in the hospital, about 1 policeman and about 5-6 detectives (including Oxxxxxxxxx) from defendant Suffolk County DA admitted themselves (one day later) without permission into Dxxxxxxxxx's home, in which X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx was then located (while X4xxxxxxxxx was outside, who then came inside the house), and falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned X1xxxxxxxxx and his sister X4xxxxxxxxx while the 6-7 employees of Suffolk County DA searched Dxxxxxxxxx's home for valuables pursuant to Search Warrant (for records only) fraudulently-obtained by them.

27A. Defendants' Platoon of 1 policeman and 6 detectives took no records or other documents (although thousands were in plain sight, plus 2 computers), but instead created and took with themscores of still photographs (without permission) of plaintiffs' art and other valuables, similar to a gang of thieves casing a museum or art store for later robbery (or in defendants' case, use of the Forfeiture Statute).

28. On January 16, 2001, the Prosecutor Defendants attached real estate and/or bank accounts of each of the plaintiffs.

29. By reason of these activities, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, xx was severely traumatized, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx was also traumatized, and plaintiff X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx (age 13), an honors student at West Hollow Middle School, during March, 2002, attempted suicide.

30. Defendants' allegations against Dxxxxxxxxx, his wife X2xxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and xxxxx are wholly meritless, and are being pursued by defendant XWxxxxxxxxx to obtain a "second bite of the apple" as a vindictive and extortionate attempt to undo a civil-action settlement to which she and her attorney had agreed.

31. Dxxxxxxxxx, a xxx doctor and xxxxx, was accused by defendant Suffolk County DA, during 1986, of unlawfully using hospital surgical assistants and a chauffeur to assist him in plastic surgery performed in Dxxxxxxxxx's medical office and in committing insurance fraud by false claims to the carriers of some patients.

31A. These claims were without substance: Dxxxxxxxxx's chauffeur drove some patients home and provided one of them, as a convenience, with bandages and some pills available without prescription over-the-counter; the one insurance-claim allegation was without merit; and the whole matter was one which the Suffolk County DA wanted to drop, and Dxxxxxxxxx was encouraged by his criminal attorney to accept a 3-month, slap-on-the-wrist sentence to end the matter.

31B. The Dxxxxxxxxx's allocution was that he had stated in an insurance claims form that a specific surgery was reconstructive (covered by insurance) when it should have been designated cosmetic (not covered).

31C. The Suffolk County DA had issued a fraudulent search warrant which caused the judge, Justice Rohle, to consider dismissing the indictment, which encouraged both sides to work out the face-saving plea agreement to stop the prosecution. Because of the criminal charges, Dxxxxxxxxx lost his practice and was bankrupt and could not afford to pay for his criminal defense.

31C. Dxxxxxxxxx served the 54-day sentence at the honor farm at Yaphank, and then worked 9 months as a volunteer for 3 locals institution (Red Cross, Association for Health of Retarded Children, and Concern, a residential facility for troubled teenagers), and his activities were well-regarded at each of these institutions.

32. Assistant District Attorney DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior A. DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior ("DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior") was the prosecuting attorney in the matter.

33. The matter was more a licensing issue between Dxxxxxxxxx and the New York medical licensing authorities, and should not have been pursued as a criminal matter.

34. To resolve the questionable criminal charges against Dxxxxxxxxx, involving the actual threat of incarceration for a non-existent crime for which Dxxxxxxxxx was indicted, Dxxxxxxxxx pleaded guilty to submitting a false insurance claim and received a 54-day sentence, which plea agreement resulted in the automatic loss of his medical license in New York, which automatically precluded him from practicing medicine elsewhere in the United States.

35. The Suffolk County DA and his staff, through the wrongful 1986-1987 prosecution of Dxxxxxxxxx,

(a) pursued and obtained massive favorable publicity by obtaining the conviction of a wealthy doctor; and

(b) upon information and belief, obtained some of the assets of Dxxxxxxxxx and his family to use without accountability for the Suffolk County DA's personal and office expenses, and for the Suffolk County DA's forthcoming reelection campaign.

36. After DA1xxxxxxxxx took over as Suffolk County DA, he quickly learned that the New York forfeiture law, CPLR Sections 1310-1352 (the "Forfeiture Statute"), gave DA1xxxxxxxxx as much money as he wanted in his power pursuit; DA1xxxxxxxxx stated in this connection: "I don't have to account to anyone for moneys that come to me."

36A. DA1xxxxxxxxx increased his power base and notoriety as a prosecutor who will do anything to win, whether legal or not, and someone to avoid entanglements with at all costs, because of his ability to abuse his position as District Attorney of Suffolk County, with no oversight except (i) periodic elections, and (ii) any civil lawsuits such as this.

36B. DA1xxxxxxxxx's method of operation with the Forfeiture Statute had only four requirements, each unlawful:

(a) That DA1xxxxxxxxx use the Forfeiture Statute only against wealthy persons and wealthy small businesses, but not against major corporations or institutions or persons aligned with him politically;

(b) That DA1xxxxxxxxx not abide by the safeguards in the Forfeiture Statute which require that (i) any attachment and levy be confirmed within 5 days by a motion (and any opposing papers); and (ii) the forfeiture proceeds be reported in detail, and (iii) the forfeiture proceeds be distributed mainly to others;

(c) That DA1xxxxxxxxx not conduct an unbiased or reasonable investigation into the circumstances of a complaint before using the Forfeiture Statute based on a complaint, because a reasonable investigation could uncover that the complainant was a liar with an axe to grind, thereby depriving DA1xxxxxxxxx of the opportunity to extort money from the complainant's victim; and

(d) That DA1xxxxxxxxx make use of the asset forfeitures personally, such as by DA1xxxxxxxxx's widely reported personal use of a seized BMW automobile and use of seized assets or fines to keep DA1xxxxxxxxx's BMW in top condition with expensive repairs (also widely reported), and for the assistant district attorneys working under DA1xxxxxxxxx to obtain economic benefits from the asset forfeitures, to encourage them to do his unlawful dirty work, with him as supervising legal terrorist.

37. Upon information and belief, Assistant District Attorney DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior A. DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior, and other persons assisting in the 1986-1987 prosecution and conviction (by plea agreement) of Dxxxxxxxxx obtained financial benefits, including promotions, for recommending the prosecution and coercing the conviction.

38. Upon information and belief, DA1xxxxxxxxx's predecessor, DA1xxxxxxxxx, their staff and their successors routinely, willfully and as a method of operation:

(a) Do not comply with the safeguard provisions or procedural requirements of the Forfeiture Statute, thereby resulting in a higher percent of seizure successes and guilty pleas from the victimized accuseds;

(b) Fail to make unbiased or reasonable investigations before making use of the Forfeiture Statute;

(c) Submit fraudulent affidavits, in bad faith, in support of the ex parte attachment motion to discourage any opposition papers (because the fraudulent affidavit is more wide-sweeping with untruths which have to be countered, at a substantially greater loss of rights not to testify against oneself under the 5th Amendment;

(d) Divert seized assets to their own personal use, directly and indirectly;

(e) Destroy the equity value of seized assets which they cannot convert to their own use (such as leased cars or a mortgaged yacht; returning them to the mortgagee or leasing company instead of the accused); and

(f) Do not have any supervision or control, through reports, audits, accounting procedures or otherwise, of the property they seize from defendants or non-defendant third parties through use of the Forfeiture Statute.

39. Upon information and belief, most of the prosecutions by the Prosecutor Defendants involving use of the Forfeiture Statute would not have been prosecuted at all by the Prosecutor Defendants but for such (wrongful) use of the statute.

40. The Prosecutor Defendants' use of the Forfeiture Statute as alleged above discourages criminal attorneys when retained by an accused (i) from putting in the extra work required to deal with the attachment because by reason of the attachment the criminal attorney is now put in substance on a contingent-fee basis for his criminal representation, which criminal lawyers know is against the Code of Professional Responsibility and grounds for disbarment; and from opposing a fraudulent motion because of the probable waiver of the accused's 5th Amendment rights not to testify against himself.

41. Because of the earlier prosecution, Dxxxxxxxxx was forced to surrender his medical license and, to earn a living, start a career of arranging financing for hospitals and medical centers throughout the United States, and was granted a $25 million line of credit from a major Chicago lender to commit to his medical receivables borrowers. From 1993 to 2001, Dxxxxxxxxx successfully arranged financing for 50 borrowers, amounting to about $128 million.

42. The delays experienced by medical-service providers in obtaining payment of moneys under government and insurance medical-insurance programs caused many medical-service providers to be in a cash-squeeze, requiring that they sell their receivables for a percentage of their stated dollar amount, and let someone else try to collect the owed amounts, and leave the medical providers free to provide medical services to its patients.

43. Through his experience in medicine and understanding of the problem faced by medical providers, Dxxxxxxxxx was able to work with medical-service providers and develop a disclosure package for them which could be presented to persons who might be interested in providing the financing be sought.

44. The activity is not unlike a law firm creating a prospectus for the public offering or private offering and sale of stock, with the various disclosures which are required to make an appropriate presentation.

45. Dxxxxxxxxx started charging consulting fees for his activities in helping clients put together the required financial packages, and a finder's fee for Dxxxxxxxxx's successful placement of an accounts-receivable financing for his medical-services client.

45A. After placing and closing nearly $50 million of account receivable financing, Dxxxxxxxxx then closed in excess of $50 million of corporate financings back by real estate collateral. By the time of the defendants' meritless attack on him, Dxxxxxxxxx had arranged about $128 million of financing for about 50 corporations and partnerships throughout the United States. The defendants have fraudulently and intentionally hidden these facts from the state court when applying for the ex parte attachment order (or permitting the order to continue) which destroyed destroyed the business of Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx.

46. Dxxxxxxxxx never told clients or prospective clients that he was the person providing the requested funding. Instead, he told them that he would function as a consultant and finder, a wholly different position than a bank, for example, which itself provides the requested loan when sought by a prospective purchaser of a home.

47. There is a rule known in the consulting and finding industry, which is that "They always try to screw the finder", meaning that the persons seeking money will promise anything to get the desired funds, but when they get the money in their hands, they very quickly forget that the finder found the money for them, and they usually think about whether they really have to pay the finder his exceedingly reasonable 1% to 4% finder's fee.

48. Many of Dxxxxxxxxx's customers reneged on their promise to pay Dxxxxxxxxx the promised finder's fee or consulting fee, including defendant XWxxxxxxxxx, and Dxxxxxxxxx brought suit against XWxxxxxxxxx and others to enforce his contractual right to payment of the earned fee.

49. To bring criminal (unlawful coercive) pressure upon Dxxxxxxxxx to avenge her settlement, XWxxxxxxxxx in November, 1999 made a complaint to the Prosecutor Defendants (reduced to affidavit on November 17, 2000) which, upon information and belief, was wholly untruthful, claiming (falsely) that Dxxxxxxxxx merely took money from persons and delivered none of the promised services. In fact, she had previously represented falsely to XD2xxxxxxxxx that she had the equity requisite to close her deal. This representation to XD2xxxxxxxxx was found later to be materially false (a difference of about $1 million plus a bogus guarantor).

50. Also, XWxxxxxxxxx alerted the Prosecutor Defendants to the amount of assets which Dxxxxxxxxx seemed to have, because of his million-dollar financings, his home in X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, his four leased vehicles (Porsche, Bentley, Range Rover, and Ferrari), and two motor boats (29 foot Fountain racing boat, $100,000 value registered to Dxxxxxxxxx; and 53 Foot Hatteras motor yacht, $450,000 value before approximately $250,000 mortgage, indirectly owned by Dxxxxxxxxx), and other attributes of wealth.

51. Upon information and belief, the Prosecutor Defendants decided, before having any communications with Dxxxxxxxxx, that they were going to bring a criminal proceeding against Dxxxxxxxxx and his corporations and a related forfeiture proceeding under the Forfeiture Statute.

52. Upon information and belief, the Prosecutor Defendants obtained the names of other persons who Dxxxxxxxxx had sued and encouraged them to provide false information to the Prosecutor Defendants which they planned to use against Dxxxxxxxxx without even asking Dxxxxxxxxx's side of the issues.

53. The Prosecutor Defendant (including Sxxxxxxxxx) then assembled the one-sided, false and perjured information from XWxxxxxxxxx and others sued by Dxxxxxxxxx, and (knowing that the information being used by Sxxxxxxxxx was false and perjured) drafted the proposed attachment papers, search warrant and arrest warrant, without any opportunity for Dxxxxxxxxx to give his side of the story.

53A. Sxxxxxxxxx thereby, on behalf of the other defendants, perjured herself when applying to the Court for the ex parte attachment and Search Warrant.

54. Without any prior notice to plaintiffs, the Prosecutor Defendants filed an ex parte attachment proceeding, obtained an order permitting the attachment, and proceeded to take the legal steps needed to prevent plaintiffs from having any use of virtually all of their worldly possessions (amounting to more than $2,500,000 in value), as follows:

(a) all real estate owned by Dxxxxxxxxx's wife X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx;

(b) all bank accounts in the name of each of the plaintiffs;

(c) all savings accounts in the name of each of the plaintiffs;

(d) all vehicles owned, used or leased by Dxxxxxxxxx and X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, consisting of four leased vehicles having about $100,000 in equity;

(e) two boats having a $200,000 equity; and

(f) other personal property through notice of attachment and subsequent levy.

54A. Although the Prosecutor Defendants were purporting to attach and conserve assets for payment to the alleged victims, it should be noted that the Prosecutor Defendants destroyed plaintiffs' equity (for whatever it was) in the four leased vehicles by returning them to the leasing company rather than returning them to plaintiffs (an equity amounting to not less than $100,000, which is an element of damage to plaintiffs); and destroyed the equity in plaintiffs' Hatteras motor yacht ($450,000 value, subject to $250,000 chattel mortgage), by returning the yacht to the mortgagee, and thereby eliminating plaintiffs' $200,000 equity in the yacht).

55. At this time, before the indictment of Dxxxxxxxxx is served on him, the Prosecutor Defendants have confiscated all of plaintiffs' assets needed by them to defend themselves against the outrageous prosecution, and even to pay any living expenses for the family including 2 minor children.

56. On January 16, 2001, a large number of detectives (about 5 plus one uniformed policeman, but not Oxxxxxxxxx) came to Dxxxxxxxxx's home, without prior notice, and arrested him in front of his family and neighbors, in what amounted to an intentional humiliation of Dxxxxxxxxx in front of his family and the intentional creation of fear and terror.

57. The arresting officers intercepted Dxxxxxxxxx while he was in one of his vehicles taking his son, X4xxxxxxxxx to school, and they refused (when requested by Dxxxxxxxxx) to permit Dxxxxxxxxx to continue with his trip to school (for arrest at school).

58. Instead, in front of Dxxxxxxxxx's son, the arresting officers caused Dxxxxxxxxx to be removed from his vehicle, in the middle of a busy street, in full view of X4xxxxxxxxx, and transported Dxxxxxxxxx to jail, while the son was looking on, wholly terrified and traumatized at what he was seeing. A detective took X4xxxxxxxxx to school in a police vehicle.

59. Moments later, Dxxxxxxxxx suffered cardiac angina pectoris and (after the custodial officers were finished making fun of him in his condition, apparently believing he was faking it), Dxxxxxxxxx was taken to a local hospital for treatment, which attack was induced by defendants' activities and reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of defendants' legal terrorism directed against plaintiffs.

60. On January 17, 2001, the Prosecutor Defendants obtained a broad search warrant to search Dxxxxxxxxx's home for financial records and bank statements relating to Dxxxxxxxxx's business as well as the prior prosecution against Dxxxxxxxxx.

61. At the time of the search, Dxxxxxxxxx was incarcerated in a hospital ward being treated for the coronary insufficiency.

62. The only persons at home at the time of the search were plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., then age 8, playing outside in the yard; and daughter (plaintiff) X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, then age 23, resting in her brother's bedroom.

63. Without obtaining or attempting to obtain permission from X1xxxxxxxxx or X4xxxxxxxxx to enter the house, the 6 or 7 detectives and policepersons from the Suffolk County DA entered the house without permission; thereafter, X4xxxxxxxxx alone entered the bedroom where X4xxxxxxxxx was resting and said: "X4xxxxxxxxx, get up, the police are here.", which was a terrifying experience for her, and for X4xxxxxxxxx

63A. X4xxxxxxxxx experienced an anxiety attack within 5 minutes after she was awakened by X4xxxxxxxxx, and went into her former bedroom and asked the detective in the room what was happening, who laughed and joked at X4xxxxxxxxx's anxiety attack and related shaking with fear. They refused to tell X4xxxxxxxxx why they were there in the house, saying only "You know why. You know why." X4xxxxxxxxx asked for a copy of any Search Warrant, and the detectives produced a copy of a search warrant, which remained in the house after the detectives left (about 2 hours after arriving).

64. The detectives, who had already started their search of the house, after confronting X4xxxxxxxxx her former bedroom, apparently continued searching the house for whatever they were seeking, but at the same time were taking still photographs (with flashbulbs) of the various paintings and other items of value contained on the walls, tables and elsewhere throughout the house - which had nothing to do with the Search Warrant. X4xxxxxxxxx asked what they were doing taking pictures inside the house, and one told her to mind her own business, and ordered her and X4xxxxxxxxx "to pick a room and stay there". X4xxxxxxxxx and X4xxxxxxxxx remained in the room (the kitchen) until X2xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and X3xxxxxxxxx arrived, before the detectives had finished.

65. The detective disregarded the two computers containing business records, bank statements and various business records and files in plain view in the house, and took nothing pursuant to their search (in violation of the plain order contained in the Search Warrant), except take with them the wrongfully-taken still photographs which now seems to be the reason for their intrusion (to identify additional assets for them to confiscate by the Forfeiture Statute).

65A. Defendants had the opportunity through their search to take records which were exculpatory (and showed that the claim of XWxxxxxxxxx and any others sued by Dxxxxxxxxx or XD2xxxxxxxxx were false), but did not do so, and took no records instead.

66. The detectives ordered X4xxxxxxxxx and X4xxxxxxxxx to go into another room (the kitchen) and remain there, which X4xxxxxxxxx and X4xxxxxxxxx understood required them to remain in the room against their will, until they were released by order of one of the detectives. No detective released them, and their release came only after the detectives left.

67. On the day of Dxxxxxxxxx's arrest, January 16, 2001, the Prosecutor Defendants with a search warrant took thousands of business records (about 90 boxes of records) maintained by plaintiffs Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx at their office, at 734 Walt Whitman Road, Suite 305, Melville, NY xxxxx.

68. Dxxxxxxxxx was permitted to make copies of the records so seized (by defendants' delivery of the records to Kinko's for copying and return to defendants, at a cost of $4,000 to Dxxxxxxxxx).

69. The records demonstrated, unequivocally, that all of the allegations by XWxxxxxxxxx and the other persons sued by Dxxxxxxxxx were false.

70. The Prosecutor Defendants did not withdraw their prosecution, but intensified it instead, making demands that Dxxxxxxxxx consent to the forefeiture of all of the attached property (including the family home) to the Prosecutor Defendants in exchange for jail time which the Prosecutor Defendants kept saying was substantially shorter than they would urge the Court to sentence him to if convicted in the criminal proceeding. It would seem that the laws of extortion (obtaining a civil end by the threat of criminal prosecution) doesn't apply to the Prosecutor Defendants.

71. Dxxxxxxxxx and his family refused to give in to the unlawful coercion by defendants.

72. The Prosecutor Defendants have never used the Forfeiture Statute against any major corporations, or accounting firms, or financial firms, or politically-powerful individuals, even though the wrongdoing was well-publicized.

73. For example, the Prosecutor Defendants never used the Forfeiture Statute against Enron or its officers, Arthur Andersen or its partners, Microsoft, Merrill Lynch or its officers, or others who in the newspapers at the time of this complaint have been accused of felonious conduct by various governmental agencies, as follows:

(a) Enron (accused of false and misleading financial statements to hide loans), with undoubtedly an impact on thousands of investors in Suffolk County, and Suffolk County District Attorney subpoenaed records, saying Enron-type case was very complex, with Enron warehouses in Suffolk County (National Public Radio, 4/11/02; New York Times, 4/6/02, Section A, p. 2; Newsday, 3/25/02, p. D06);

(b) Arthur Andersen (admitting to destroying documents needed in various investigations of Enron, and helping Enron hide the loans over various years, with 1,700 Andersen partners receiving compensation of $10,000 per week each to help their clients hide wrongdoing), with an undoubted impact on thousands of investors in Suffolk County (Newsday, 4/21/02, 4/19/02, 4/16/02);

(c) Microsoft (abusing a monopoly it has on windows which results in higher prices for consumers in Suffolk County, with Attorney General Spitzer of New York as lead attorney genera) (New York Times, 11/6/01)

(d) Merrill Lynch, investigation by the United States (causing Suffolk County customers to lose on their investments by the manner in which Merrill Lynch compensates its financial analysts) (CNN, Lou Dobbs 4/11/02; CNNFN Money Line 4/11/02);

(e) Port Jefferson Station car dealer xxxxx, who borrowed $5 billion illicitly from General Motors Acceptance Corporation with hundreds of individuals and institutions becoming collateral victims (Newsday, 12/31/92, p. 5);

(f) xxxxx, 30-year old celebrity publicist, backing her father's 2001 Mercedes SUV into a throng outside an inn and injuring at least 16 persons and leaving the scene, with lawsuits totaling about $100 million (Cox News Service, 8/15/01);

(g) Nine persons passing $180,000 in bad checks over a 2-year period, arrested during October, 1998 (Newsday, 10/31/98);

(h) xxxx (alias "xxxx"), fraudulently obtaining goods and services from businesses all over Long Island, with more than 100 victims ($100,000) during two years (Newsday, 7/1/97);

(i) xxxx, Chairman, and Sotheby's in their $43.8 million in overcharges (and related guilty plea of Taubman), some overcharges affecting individuals and businesses in Suffolk County (NYPost 4/23/02 p., 4; AP Online, 4/23/02);

(j) Pedophile priests on Long Island, no attachments against Catholic Church to cover damages suffered by Long Island victims; DA1xxxxxxxxx had a non-church pedophile case back in 1997 involving computer pedophiles (Daily News, 10/3/97, p. 6); and recently the Suffolk County DA convened a grand jury to investigate these charges against the church (and with damages amounting to probably hundreds of millions of dollars or more), but with no attachment proceeding; and

(k) DA1xxxxxxxxx's list of the "Top 10 Scams on Long Island" Newsday, 8/20/97).

-- or these ongoing problems of Suffolk County businesses and professions providing the promised services to only a portion of their customers, without telling them that they can't expect to get what they think they're paying for:

(1) Banks which charge commitment fees for home mortgages which are never obtained by the prospective purchasers located in Suffolk County; and

(2) Millions of dollars paid to defense attorneys in Suffolk County without being told that they have only 1 chance in 25 or 50 of avoiding conviction, because of Suffolk County's fee and plea system.

74. By reason of the activities of defendants, and the resulting impact upon her among family, classmates and community, plaintiff X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, at age 13 (formerly an honor student and among the most popular students in her class), has become socially withdrawn, less of a student, despondent, who attempted suicide and continues under medication and psychiatric care.

75. These consequences in light of the activities alleged above, were reasonably foreseeable by defendants.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Taking of Plaintiffs' Property without Due Process

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

76. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 1, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-75 above and further allege that the activities of each of the defendants are in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 as a taking of plaintiffs' property without due process of law afforded to plaintiffs under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, through the 14th Amendment thereto, and of comparable New York law including Article I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution ("No person shall be deprived of ... property without due process of law").

77. On or about January 16, 2001, defendants made an ex parte motion under CPLR 1317 for and obtained an "ex parte order of attachment" (the "Ex Parte Order") of described real and personal property belonging to the plaintiffs.

78. A description of the property so attached is annexed as Exhibit B hereto, which consists of pages 4-11 of the Ex Parte Order (Index No. 01-00437).

78A. Approximately $300,000 to $400,000 of the moneys in the xxxxx account are in a certificate of deposit, which funds were never disbursed and never belonged to X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx or XD2xxxxxxxxx; these moneys came from Eunice Dxxxxxxxxx, the grandmother of Dxxxxxxxxx's children, and were being held in trust by Dxxxxxxxxx for them with their knowledge.

79. No notice of any kind was given to any of the plaintiffs about any intention by the defendants to seek a court order attaching their property.

80. No opportunity was given for any of the plaintiffs to oppose the Prosecutor Defendants' motion for the order attaching plaintiffs' assets.

81. The assets attached constituted virtually all of the property owned by each of the plaintiffs, literally bankrupting them instantaneously, without notice or opportunity to be heard, and making them unable to pay their normal business and living expenses including food, shelter and medical expenses for them and their two minor children.

82. The effect upon plaintiffs was the same as could be predicted for xxxxxx if the defendants had chosen instead to tie up all of Arthur Andersen's checking and other bank accounts, real property, vehicles, investment accounts, petty cash accounts, computers, chairs, desks, leases, payroll accounts, tax accounts and other assets used and needed to exist in society today.

83. Upon information and belief, a copy of the Ex Parte Order (the "Order") was served only on plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, on the day of the arrest, after defendants had served or filed copies of the Order to stop any use or sale of the attached personal and real property.

84. Upon information and belief, the following plaintiffs were never served with a copy of the Ex Parte Order: X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx,

85. The terms of the Ex Parte Order, at page 11 (see Exhibit B) imposed the following requirements on the defendants within the present action: "ORDERED, that the plaintiff shall make a motion on notice to the defendants and to the garnishees, for an order confirming the grounds upon which this order of attachment was granted, no later than five days after levy is made. Said motion shall be made on notice of no less than eight days and no more than fifteen days, and shall be served personally upon defendants and either personally or by certified mail upon any garnishees; and it is further * * * ORDERED, that the supporting papers to this Order shall not be served upon the defendants until the motion to confirm this Order is made pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules section 1317(2).

86. Defendants made the motion to confirm on January 17, 2001, but with wide-sweeping, material misrepresentations of fact, drafted with numerous materially-false statements to require the Accused Plaintiffs in the instant action to remain silent and not oppose the motion to confirm until the criminal proceeding is resolved, because of the known prevailing practice among local defense counsel to counsel their clients not to respond to the prosecutors' false (and any truthful) charges because such opposing papers, under oath, could be used as evidence against the clients in the criminal matter.

86A. Although the Forfeiture Statute requires and contemplates a motion to confirm within 5 days from an attachment and levy, the statute is routinely avoided by staying the opposing papers and answer to the attachment and forfeiture complaint because the statute fails to provide 5th Amendment protection against self incrimination or related use by the claiming agent (i.e., prosecutor), thereby enabling the Prosecutor Defendants, through false and misleading papers, to deprive the criminal defendants of the property they need to defend themselves, in both the criminal matter, as well as the related civil action under the Forfeiture Statute.

86B. Accordingly, through this scheme and artifice to defraud, the Prosecutor Defendants are able to create a false record for a judge without opposition, and take away the defendants' property with impunity, because of the need for the defendant to give up his/her 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination to oppose criminal acts and prosecutorial abuse by the prosecutor.

87. Defendants were aware of and depended on the effect their activities as alleged above would have on the ability of criminal defendants to be able to oppose the fraudulent and unlawful attachment proceedings and to hire counsel of choice in the related criminal matter, because of the ability to use fraud to deprive an accused of either his property or his liberty, and usually both, without any recourse in the related proceedings.

88. Upon information and belief, defendants met and discussed among each other before filing for the Ex Parte Order how the desired order would prevent the Accused Plaintiffs from defending themselves against criminal charges which defendants themselves knew were not provable, and required a guilty plea by Dxxxxxxxxx to obtain any conviction on the charges and for defendants to ultimately keep plaintiffs' property, or as much of it as they could extort from plaintiffs.

89. Upon information and belief, defendants followed a written or oral rule or procedure of the Suffolk County DA for using the Forfeiture Statute to coerce wealthy individuals (but never any major corporations or institutions) into pleading guilty to meritless charges to enable the wealthy individual to save some of the earned assets for his family, at the cost of doing a lesser number of years in prison than would normally be meted out upon conviction of such (meritless) charges through whatever means the defendants would employ to obtain a conviction (such as by purchasing testimony of an employee of plaintiff, who has the same prosecutor's gun to his head to say whatever the prosecutor wants him to say, to avoid meritless criminal prosecution against the employee).

90. Defendants' strategy for convicting plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and others similarly situated revolves around and depends upon the unlawful taking of the property of the accused, with resulting extortion and coercion to force a guilty plea, reduced sentence, and return of some of the unlawfully seized property, with the defendants keeping the rest, and using it to prey on other victims.

91. Clearly, a grand jury should be convened by Suffolk County to look into these charges, except that the defendants themselves cannot be expected to look into their own wrongdoing. See Exhibit A to see how the Suffolk County Legislature attempted to make an end run around DA1xxxxxxxxx's allegedly corrupt District Attorney's Office.

92. Upon information and belief, defendants met and discussed among each other before filing for the Ex Parte Order, and followed written or oral procedures from defendant Suffolk County DA, to, cripple the plaintiffs financially as the main litigation strategy to coerce some of the plaintiffs into pleading guilty to meritless criminal charges brought against some of the plaintiffs by defendants.

92A. Defendants drafted and presented the proposed Order specifically for the purpose of obtaining the result described in the preceding paragraph.

93. The above-alleged activities of each of the defendants were performed by them as part of their employment activities with the Suffolk County DA, under color of law and as state action, under policy, rules and guidelines, written and oral, by which prosecutions are to take place by the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office of wealthy individuals for the purpose of confiscating their property for both official and personal use and benefit by defendants.

94. The property described in Exhibit B, having a market value of approximately $3,000,000, remains attached by defendants except for approximately $65,000 which was released by defendants as assets of the children.

95. The activities of each of the defendants caused each of the plaintiffs to be deprived of their respective property(ies), under color of law and as state action by the defendants, who were acting in conspiracy with each other, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, through the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, and in violation of Article I, Section 6, last sentence, of the New York Constitution and related New York law.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

96. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the wrongful taking of the plaintiff's property to the extent of the value thereof, as follows:

A. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, $-0- in real property and $900,000 in personal property (held by xxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx);

B. Plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, $650,000 in real property (less mortgage and tax liens) and $200 in personal property;

C. Plaintiff X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, $-0- in real property and $100,000 in personal property (held by xxxxx);

D. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., $-0- in real property and $100,000 in personal property (held by xxxxx);

E. Plaintiff X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, $-0- in real property and $100,000 in personal property (held by xxxxx);

F. Plaintiff XD2xxxxxxxxx, $-0- in real property; and personal property as described in subparagraphs A and C-E above;

G. Plaintiff XD3xxxxxxxxx, $-0- in real property; and personal property as described in subparagraph A above; and

H. Plaintiff xxxxx., $-0- in real property; and personal property held in trust for other plaintiffs (as described in subparagraphs A and C-E above).

97. Each of the plaintiffs has lost the value of plaintiff's use of the attached real property and/or personal property during the period that the property has been taken and removed from plaintiff's control and use, amounting to a dollar amount which will be proven with specificity at the time of trial.

98. Each of the plaintiffs has suffered consequential economic damages as a result of defendants' activities, in a dollar amount as to each plaintiff which will be proven with certainty at the time of trial.

99. Each of the plaintiffs has suffered emotionally from the willful activities of the defendants which were calculated and used by defendants to inflict terror, humiliation, adverse publicity and emotional and traumatic injury on each of the defendants (as more fully described in Paragraphs 187-188 and 196-198 below), in a dollar amount as to each plaintiff amounting to $10,000,000 or more, which amount for each plaintiff will be proven with certainty at the time of trial.

100. Each of the defendants were motivated by evil motive and intent, with callous indifference to the federally-protected rights of plaintiffs and others, and defendants acted willfully, wantonly, egregiously, with reckless abandon and high degree of moral culpability, and with near or actual criminal indifference to the laws of the United States and New York, as the way in which defendants conduct their prosecution business in Suffolk County, for which each of the defendants is liable to each of the plaintiffs for punitive damages in an amount to be set by the trier of fact.

101. Plaintiffs are threatened with irreparable injury by having been deprived of substantially all of their property, including their home (through currently-threatened foreclosure), by defendants' activities, substantially impairing their economic existence, including life insurance, mortgage payments, medical payments, and the legal costs needed by the Accused Plaintiffs to properly defend against defendants' outrageous tactics, and to obtain return of plaintiffs' wrongfully-taken property.

102. Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from continuing with their attachment, garnishment, seizure and use or distribution of plaintiffs' property, and for an order directing the return of all attached property or the fair market value thereof where return is not possible, plus interest.

Declaratory Judgment as to the Facial Unconstitutionality of CPLR 1321-1352 (Forfeiture Statute) and Its Unconstitutional Application as to Plaintiffs under the United States Constitution and New York Constitution

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants Except XWxxxxxxxxx)

103. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 2, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-102 above and further allege that the New York Forfeiture Statute, CPLR 1312-1352, as enacted, is facially unconstitutional under Art. I, Section 8, Cl. of the U.S. Constitution (impermissible burden on interstate commerce), the 5th Amendment through the 14th Amendment (denial of due process; and denial of equal protection), and the 6th Amendment through the 14th Amendment (denial of fair trial), and under Art. I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution; and further that the Forfeiture Statute is unconstitutional as applied by defendants against plaintiffs under the same provisions. Facially Unconstitutional

104. CPLR Section 1317[1] provides that a claiming agent (herein, the Prosecutor Defendants) may obtain an order of attachment of all of a persons assets without notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to order of attachment.

105. CPLR Section 1317[2] provides that an attachment without notice must be followed by a confirming motion by the claiming authority "within a period not to exceed five days after levy".

106. CPLR Section 1317[1] provides that the "order shall direct the claiming agent to levy within his or her jurisdiction, at any time before final judgment, upon such property in which the defendant has an interest and upon such debts owing to the defendant as will satisfy the amount specified in the order of attachment."

107. The statutory provision requiring a motion to confirm within 5 days after levy is wholly illusory when the statute is used in a criminal context, because (as alleged previously) the criminal defendant cannot make the motion without giving up his/her 5th Amendment rights against self incrimination, no matter how outrageously false the prosecutor's moving affidavits may be. There is no protection in the statute against fraud of the prosecutor.

108-110. Omitted.

111. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Statute deprives the defendant from (i) opposing the fraudulent attachment because of the loss of 5th Amendment rights and (ii) obtaining the immediate, skilled legal services needed to oppose the attachment and levy(ies), and causes the defendant to wind up with counsel other than the counsel the defendant would otherwise have chosen. No provision is made for 5th Amendment right protection or the payment of the legal fees needed to pay to oppose the confirmation motion required to be made 5 days after the attachment and levy takes place, a time at which the person whose property has been attached may have no money to pay for an attorney.

112. Also, the claiming agent under the Forfeiture Statute seized the assets of persons who were not named as defendants in the related criminal proceeding, namely: X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., without any notice or opportunity to be heard.

113. These attachments of non-defendants without notice or opportunity to be heard were permitted under CPLR Section 1313, "Debt or property subject to attachment; proper garnishee".

114. No notice is required under the Forfeiture Statute to attach the property (such as stock, savings accounts, checking accounts, television sets, automobiles, land, home, farm) of the family members of the defendant in the criminal proceeding. This is wholly different from the attachment of a debt which a non-defendant garnishee owes to the defendant, which generally should make no different to the garnishee to whom payment is to be made.

115. Also, the Forfeiture Statute does not have any standards for use of the statute, which allows a criminal prosecutor to use the civil statute selectively, discriminatorily and arbitrarily as defendants did against plaintiffs in this action, whereas the statute, designated a civil statute, makes no provision for any taxpayer or person injured by the criminal defendant to commence an attachment under the statute when the Suffolk County DA (as usual) failed to commence any attachment proceeding.

116. The defendants have never used the statute against major corporations which have committed violations of New York law causing economic injury to residents of Suffolk County, nor have defendants ever used the statute against politically powerful defendants being prosecuted by them; nor have the defendants used the statute to obtain obtain funds to pay to victims in any of the thousands of criminal cases brought by defendants in which Suffolk County residents suffered economic, compensable injury by the defendants.

117. Defendants' only use of the Forfeiture Statute is to justify taking the cash or drugs seized from drug traffickers, prostitutes or unlawful gamblers by arresting officials, or in a handful of instances where the defendants see an opportunity to obtain major publicity, with little chance of opposition (because the attachment prevents meaningful legal opposition), and assets which defendants can convert to their own use without trial by coercing the defendant to accept a plea rather than risk much more serious penalties -- all without any substantial evidence of wrongdoing by the defendant.

118. The Forfeiture Statute is facially unconstitutional for the foregoing reasons. Unconstitutional as Applied to Plaintiffs

119. Also, or in the alternative, and based on the foregoing and succeeding allegations, the Forfeiture Statute has been unconstitutionally applied by defendants (other than XWxxxxxxxxx) against each of the plaintiffs.

120. In using the Forfeiture Statement against plaintiffs, the Defendant Prosecutors have

A. Deliberately falsified their supporting affidavits by claiming that none of the customers of plaintiffs Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx ever obtained the financing for which moneys had been paid by the customers to such plaintiffs; in fact, such plaintiffs obtained financing for approximately fifty corporations and partnerships in a total amount of approximately $128,000,000;

B. Deliberately failed to take into account the massive amount of exculpatory evidence delivered by plaintiffs to the Defendant Prosecutors (in the form of business records) which prove the truth of the allegations in the preceding paragraph;

C. Employed the Forfeiture Statute against plaintiffs in a selective, arbitrary, discriminatory way in connection with the related criminal proceeding commenced by the Prosecutor Defendants;

D. Through their fraud put the Accused Plaintiffs in a position of much higher risk in any effort to oppose the motion to confirm (because of the need to have longer, more elaborate affidavits from the Accused Plaintiffs themselves, wich crate more opportunities for the prosecution to turn the Accuseds' words against them, when losing the 5th Amendment right not to testify against oneself), thereby depriving these plaintiffs (and the others) of the assets needed to oppose the attachment and to oppose the criminal proceedings - to coerce plaintiffs Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx into accepting a guilty plea and forfeiture of most of the attached assets.

E. The Prosecutor Defendant[s] already took for their own use or vindictive destruction of equity, and without any intention of liquidating these assets for the benefit of alleged victims, the attached 4 leased vehicles, the attached Hatteras motor yacht and 29 foot Fountain racing boat belonging to Dxxxxxxxxx, as part of a bail agreement, and upon information and belief have either destroyed plaintiffs' $250,000 (yacht and vehicles) equity by giving the items back to the mortgagor, or are using the assets for personal purposes, which is their alleged intention as to the other attached assets still held by them.

121. The Forfeiture Statute is unconstitutional as applied to each of the plaintiffs for the foregoing reasons.

122. Each of the plaintiffs has been injured and irreparably injured by the Prosecutor Defendants' use of the Forfeiture Statute in various ways including the loss of substantially all of their assets, loss of their home through potential eviction, inability to retain counsel of choice in the criminal proceedings and suffering of destruction of Dxxxxxxxxx's business activities, reputation, and related adverse impact on his family, including inability to continue paying mortgage, medical and insurance expenses; and a recent suicide attempt by daughter X3xxxxxxxxx which resulted in her hospitalization at the North Shore University Medical Center.

122A. For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Forfeiture Statute is facially unconstitutional, and that the Forfeiture Statute is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Prosecutorial Abuse

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

123. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 3, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-122A above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and comparable New York law as actionable prosecutorial abuse by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

124. The defendants conspired with each other and, acting in concert, performed the following acts of prosecutorial abuse directed at the plaintiffs:

A. The activities described in Paragraphs 1-122 above;

B. Material misrepresentation by XWxxxxxxxxx to the Prosecutor Defendants concerning the activities of Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and xxxxx, falsely claiming that these three plaintiffs (i) had failed to find financing for her; (ii) had failed to find financing for many other customers, and (iii) and brought an action for breach of contract against her and others without justification;

C. The Prosecutor Defendants drafted all of their attachment and attachment confirmation motion papers based on statements made by persons XD2xxxxxxxxx had sued or threatened to sue, and had not yet taken any documents from the plaintiffs herein by subpoena (the first subpoena was January 16, 2001, on the date of Dombrof's arrest) and had never communicated with Dxxxxxxxxx prior to the arrest;

D. The Prosecutor Defendants intentionally disregarded the subpoenaed documents which they received on January 16, 2001 which proved that the Accused Plaintiffs were being wrongfully accused (see the four material facts which the subpoenaed documents prove, as described in Paragraph 26A [A-D] above), but did nothing to undo the attachment or stop the prosecution;

E. The Prosecutor Defendants took plaintiffs' property without even asking plaintiffs whether there was any truth to the claims of the persons sued (or threatened to be sued) by XD2xxxxxxxxx.

F. The Prosecutor Defendants selectively decided to use the Forfeiture Statute to deprive the plaintiffs of all of their assets while not ever using the Forfeiture Statute against any other non-drug defendants (with rare exceptions), in what amounted to selective, arbitrary, discriminatory use of the Forfeiture Statute against the three plaintiffs and other members of their family;

G. The Prosecutor Defendants falsified their affidavit (by claiming they had investigated the facts reasonably, when in fact they had not, and relied on one-sided, biased persons solicited by the Prosecutor Defendants with a strong motivation to lie) in support of their motion for an ex parte attachment order knowing that they would obtain the attachment without anyone revealing the fraudulent statements to the Court, with the result that the Prosecutor Defendants would take control of all property of the plaintiffs, and plaintiffs would have no assets with which to effectively oppose the attachment;

G. The Prosecutor Defendants intended to and did attach and levy upon plaintiffs' assets for the purpose of converting at least some of them to the personal use of one or more of the Prosecutor Defendants, without any accounting for such taking or use to any court or legislative body;

H. The Prosecutor Defendants decided to use the Forfeiture Statute against the plaintiffs without any standards to guide them in use for non-drug cases, other than to obtain a conviction through coercion and extortion;

I. The Prosecutor Defendants made use of a prior instance involving Dxxxxxxxxx which itself was meritless to create prejudice against plaintiffs in the press and with the court while applying for the ex parte attachment order;

J. The Prosecutor Defendants even obtained and used a search warrant requesting documents relating to the events which allegedly took place in 1985;

K. The Prosecutor Defendants withheld material exculpatory evidence from the grand jury (evidence which showed that the prosecutor had no case against any of the four Accused Plaintiffs);

L. The Prosecutor Defendants relied upon disgruntled former customers of the three plaintiffs who owed money to said plaintiffs, and did not investigate plaintiffs' side of the issue, and did not ask about plaintiffs' side of the issue before obtaining the indictment and ex parte attachment order;

M. The Prosecutor Defendants solicited former customers of plaintiffs who owed plaintiffs money and, upon information and belief, told them that if they complained about plaintiffs to the Prosecutor Defendants, the Prosecutor Defendants would obtain a cancellation of their indebtedness to the three plaintiffs as well as a refund of any moneys which such customers had previously paid to the three plaintiffs;

N. The Prosecutor Defendants engaged in the business of civil debt collection (or worse, coercion for payment of non-existent debts) by using their power to commence criminal proceedings and related asset attachment power, to force the Accused Plaintiffs into paying moneys to the solicited complainants, and into turning over the remaining part of plaintiffs' worldly goods to the Prosecutor Defendants for their official and personal use;

O. The Prosecutor Defendants sought and obtain information and advice from Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior A. DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior who during 1986-1987 had prosecuted Dxxxxxxxxx on non-criminal activities, to learn from her how to turn a civil matter into a non-existent criminal matter through unlawful coercion; ADA DA5xxxxxxxxxPrior, herself involved in the obtaining of a fraudulent search warrant in 1986, has repeatedly since then displayed a bias against Dxxxxxxxxx and has conspired with ADA Sxxxxxxxxx to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

P. The Prosecutor Defendants maliciously and intentionally involved family members of Dxxxxxxxxx to put economic, family and psychological pressure on Dxxxxxxxxx to give in to defendants' unlawful coercion, and permit the defendants to keep the bulk of plaintiffs' property, in exchange for agreeing not to force Dxxxxxxxxx into a criminal trial with a substantially more serious outcome for him and his family, especially when the Prosecutor Defendants have deprived plaintiffs of their assets needed to put up effective legal resistance to defendants' legal terrorism;

Q. The activities of the Prosecutor Defendants have created a liability by them personally to each of the plaintiffs with a resulting conflict of interest, requiring them to recuse themselves from the prosecution, and their failure to so recuse themselves is a further prosecutorial abuse.

125. The activities alleged in the preceding paragraph and its sub-paragraphs are state action, performed under color of law, and amount to serious prosecutorial abuse directed against each of the plaintiffs.

126. These activities constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by each of the defendants.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

127. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above, and is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Obstruction of Justice; Unlawful Coercion; and Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice;

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

128. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 4, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-128 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and comparable New York law as actionable obstruction of justice, unlawful coercion and conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1951 (the "Hobbs Act") by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

129. Section 1951 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, entitled "Interference with commerce by threats or violence", provides in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section--

(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

130. The activities of defendants fall within the definition of "robbery" as well as "extortion" or attempted robbery and attempted extortion.

131. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law, and amount to serious prosecutorial abuse directed against each of the plaintiffs.

132. The activities of defendants are unlawful under 18 U.S.C. Section 1951, and constitute another violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by each of the defendants.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

133. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above, and is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Infringement on Plaintiffs' First Amendment Rights to Petition for Redress

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

134. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 5, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-133 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and comparable New York law as an infringement on plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to petition for a redress of grievances by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

135. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law, and are an unlawful infringement of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights (and comparable rights under the New York Constitution) to petition the courts for a redress of their grievances.

136. The activities of defendants constitute another violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by each of the defendants.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

137. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above, and is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 and Comparable New York Law - Denial of Equal Rights under the Law

(Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx - against All Defendants)

138. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 6, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-137 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 and comparable New York law as a denial of equal rights under the law, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

139. Section 1981 of Title 42, U.S. Code, entitled "Equal rights under the law", provides in relevant part:

Section 1981. Equal rights under the law

(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined. For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

140. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law, and are an unlawful infringement of plaintiffs' rights to enforce contracts and be parties to private litigation without interference by defendants under color of law.

141. The activities of defendants constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 by each of the defendants.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

142. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above, and is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Denial of 6th Amendment Right to a Fair Trial

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

143. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 7, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-142 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and comparable New York law as an infringement, of plaintiffs' 6th Amendment right to a fair trial, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

144. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law, and are an unlawful infringement of plaintiffs' Sixth Amendment right (and comparable right under the New York Constitution) to petition the courts for a redress of their grievances.

145. The activities of defendants constitute another violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by each of the defendants.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

146. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above, and is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

Unlawful Destruction of Business

(Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx - against All Defendants)

147. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and XD2xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 8, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-146 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to an intentional, unlawful destruction of the businesses of the plaintiffs, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

148. By attaching substantially all of the assets of the plaintiffs, including their business assets, and by interfering with the relationships of the plaintiffs with their customers, and by commencing criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs without taking into account the massive evidence supplies by plaintiffs to contradict the complaint of former customer XWxxxxxxxxx, the defendants willfully, wantonly, egregiously and maliciously drove plaintiffs out of business, without justification.

149. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

150. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above.

Inducing Breach of Contract; and Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships between Plaintiffs and Their Customers

(Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and xxxxx - against All Defendants)

151. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and xxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 9, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-150 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to inducing breach of contract; and tortious interference with the contractual relationship between plaintiffs and their customers, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

152. By attaching substantially all of the assets of the plaintiffs, including their business assets, and by inserting themselves into the contractual dispute between the plaintiffs and XWxxxxxxxxx and other customers being sued by plaintiffs, the defendants wrongfully induced other customers of plaintiffs not to perform under their contracts with plaintiffs; and tortiously interfered with the contractual relationship between plaintiffs and such other customers.

153. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

154. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above.

Unlawful Breaking and Entry into Plaintiffs' House; and Trespass

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

155. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 10, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-154 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to an unlawful trespass, and unlawful breaking and entry into the house owned, lived in and/or then occupied or used by the plaintiffs, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

156. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Search Warrant (undated) signed by Judge Trotter, Suffolk Count District Court Judge (the "Search Warrant"), issued on the basis of "Proof, by affidavit, having been this day made before me by Detective DA4xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Shield #1053, that there is probable cause for believing that certain property" [in the form of files and records] exists at the premises described below, and that "YOU ARE, THEREFORE, COMMANDED, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. to make a search of the entire premises of X1xxxxxxxxxaddress3 X1xxxxxxxxxaddressoad, X1xxxxxxxxxaddress2, County of Suffolk, State of New York ("Plaintiffs' House"), a single family one story ranch type dwelling ... for the following property:" [describing only "files and documents", "all records", "all bank records", and "all records relating to assets"] and "If you find the same or any part thereof, bring it forthwith before me at my office in the Town of Islip, County of Suffolk, New York."

157. On January 17, 2001, about 6 cars (1 marked as a police car, and the other 5 being unmarked detective cars) owned by the Suffolk County Police Department drove up to Plaintiffs' House with a platoon of about 6 detectives and/or district attorneys (including defendant Oxxxxxxxxx) and one uniformed police officer (the "Platoon"), armed with the Search Warrant ostensibly to search for documents.

158. But this was not their intention. The Platoon came with no boxes to carry away records, and with no boxes, handtrucks or dollies to carry and wheel away files, filing cabinets or electronic storage media (such as computers, backup equipment, backup media). The only equipment they came with was one or more cameras with flash equipment, to take pictures of the non-record items of value in Plaintiffs' House (such as paintings, works of art, furniture, rugs, drapes, pictures, photographs, bedroom furnishings, living room furnishings, kitchen appliances and other equipment and utensils; anything made of gold, silver or other valuable metal or stone; expensive clocks, watches and rings; and other symbols showing the lifestyle of plaintiffs). Defendant Oxxxxxxxxx who was present told X4xxxxxxxxx that "I wish I had something [to use] to take this Grand Piano".

Unauthorized Entry into Plaintiffs' House

159. Dxxxxxxxxx had been arrested one day earlier, on January 16, 2001, and was hospitalized thereafter for a coronary insufficiency (angina pectoris) attack brought on by his arrest, and was in the hospital (under arrest) from January 16, 2001 through January 19, 2001.

160. At 6:00 p.m. on January 17, 2001, plaintiffs X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx and X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx were away from Plaintiff's House, and plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. (who resided at the house) was playing outside the house, and his oldest sister, plaintiff X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx was resting in a bedroom in the house.

161. Without obtaining permission from anyone, the whole Platoon admitted themselves into the house and (without any permission from any occupant of the Plaintiffs' House) started taking scores of still photographs of the paintings, walls, furniture, and other items reflecting plaintiffs' standard of living, none of which snapshots had any relevance to the Search Warrant.

162. The Platoon did not even search for or remove even a single record-type or banking-account type document, even though there were the following business records (relating to plaintiffs Dxxxxxxxxx, XD2xxxxxxxxx and xxxxx) in plain sight in Plaintiff's House:

(i) office type computer located in the kitchen with data processing files containing thousands of business records;

(ii) office type computer located in a small office room also containing data processing files with thousands of business records;

(iii) hundreds of storage media containing thousands of business records and backup files located in the kitchen and small office near the computer;

(iv) locked vault containing business records; (v) one 2-drawer filing cabinet containing thousands of business records;

(vi) bank statements for various years for various checking accounts; and

(vii) various files and bank records in the living room.

163. The Platoon left without taking a single document of the described type: "files and documents", "all records", "all bank records", and "all records relating to assets", and failed to do as instructed in the Search Warrant, which was to take the described documents actually found by them to the issuing Judge.

164. Defendants and their Platoon wilfully and maliciously for the ulterior purpose of seeking assets to confiscate went beyond the terms of the Search Warrant issued for other reasons, and at the same time failed to follow any of the directions contained in the Search Warrant, thereby rendering the Search Warrant null and void and providing no defense whatsoever for defendants' activities as alleged in this count.

164A. Alternatively, the Platoon found that none of the documents found by them were incriminating or helped to prove any of the claims being made against the Accused Plaintiffs, which resulted in their unlawful refusal to take or deal with exculpatory evidence found by them in their investigation, and unlawful failure to correct the injustice being perpetrated by the defendants on all of the plaintiffs.

165. The procurement of the search warrant was fraudulent, because the defendants had no intention of searching for documents and were interested instead in locating assets to confiscate through defendants' fraudulent forfeiture scheme.

166. The above-described activities of defendants constituted an actionable trespass and breaking and entering into Plaintiffs' House.

167. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

168. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above.

Unlawful Search and Seizure - 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 - Infringement of 4th Amendment Rights and Comparable New York Law

(All Plaintiffs - against All Defendants)

169. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr., XD2xxxxxxxxx, xxxxx and XD3xxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 11, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-169 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to an infringement of plaintiffs' rights under the 4th Amendment (through the 14th Amendment) prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and comparable New York law, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

170. The above-described activities of defendants, involving

(i) a Search Warrant procured by fraud, with no grounds and with malicious motive;

(ii) defendants' victim being imprisoned in a hospital with a condition intentionally caused by defendants;

(iii) a Search Warrant which defendants did not intend to follow;

(iv) a Search Warrant which was in fact not followed by defendants and wholly disregarded by them);

(v) falsely stating to plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx during their presence in the house, "Don't worry, we're not here for your personal possessions."); and

(vi) with ulterior activities unrelated to the Search Warrant to identify and photograph other assets of the plaintiffs for later confiscation by defendants --

constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and an infringement of plaintiffs' 4th Amendment right (through the 14th Amendment and under comparable New York law), prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure,

171. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

172. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above.

False Arrest; and False Imprisonment

(Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, xxx and X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx - against All Defendants)

173. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 12, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-172 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to false arrest and false imprisonment, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

174. While Defendants' Platoon of police and detectives were illegally taking still photographs and searching Plaintiffs' House for items of value for later confiscation by defendants, one of the members of defendants' Platoon ordered X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. and X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx to go into a room and remain there until told they could leave, under implied threat of higher degree of arrest, imprisonment and possible physical abuse.

175. The plaintiffs understood that they were required to go to a room (kitchen) and remain there under confinement, without being able to go into any other rooms of the Plaintiffs' House, until the Platoon, or one of its members, released them from their imprisonment.

176. The plaintiffs went into the room as ordered and remained there for about one hour, while the defendants' Platoon continued with their taking of pictures and ostensible search.

177. Each of the defendants, as co-conspirators with the members of the defendants' Platoon, intended to confine the plaintiffs as alleged; both of the plaintiffs were conscious of the confinement, and X4xxxxxxxxx asked if they could leave the kitchen, but were told "No", and were only released from the confinement by the detectives' departure; neither of the plaintiffs consented to the confinement but were forced into the confinement by reason of the defendants' and Platoon's use of color of law and presence of guns on their person to back up the directions they gave to plaintiffs; and plaintiffs were unaware that the Search Warrant had been fraudulently procured and that the Platoon was not following its terms by their activities; and (iv) the confinement was not privileged.

178. The Platoon left in their respective cars at about 8:00 p.m. after having taken over control of Plaintiffs' House for their unlawful purposes for a period of about 2 hours.

179. Upon information and belief, DA1xxxxxxxxx was informed about the results of the Platoon's unlawful search, seizure (of still photographs of plaintiffs' valuables) and the false arrest and false imprisonment of plaintiffs, and received copies of the still photographs for DA1xxxxxxxxx to decide what assets he wanted to take for his own personal use, as well as personal use by the other Prosecutor Defendants, and for unlawful use by DA1xxxxxxxxx's employees.

180. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

181. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, as alleged in Paragraphs 96-99 above, and is entitled to punitive damages as alleged in Paragraph 100 above.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Injury

(Plaintiffs X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, xxx - against All Defendants)

182. Plaintiffs X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx xxxx. (hereinafter, in this Count 13, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-181 above and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to an intention infliction of emotional injury on each of the plaintiffs, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

183. The activities of each of the defendants as alleged above

(i) constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, prohibited by various statutes, constitutional provisions and common decency, which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society;

(ii) done by defendants to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress;

(iii) with the activities of the defendants having a substantial causal connection with the emotional injury suffered by each of the plaintiffs, and

(iv) severe emotional distress suffered by each of the two plaintiffs, age 8 and 11 on January 16, 2001, the date of Dxxxxxxxxx's arrest in the presence of his son, X1xxxxxxxxx;

[v] unlawful attachment of all of the plaintiffs' assets, on January 16, 2001; and

[vi] unlawful search and seizure (in the presence of X4xxxxxxxxx) on January 17, 2001, pursuant to a fraudulently-procured Search Warrant on January 16, 2001.

184. By reason of the attachment of all of plaintiffs' assets, the Dxxxxxxxxx family has been left without the moneys needed by them to pay their normal expenses of living, medical bills, legal fees to oppose defendants' reign of legal terror, household expenses, insurance payments, psychiatric and other counseling expenses, and various other expenses being incurred by a family having the assets which plaintiffs enjoyed prior to defendants' attachment thereof. 185. The oppressive activities by defendants, including the taking of substantially all of the plaintiffs' assets, has created a substantial change in the mental well-being of the plaintiffs, from one of prosperity and optimism, to one of poverty, uncertainty for the future, and the ever-threatened loss of Dxxxxxxxxx from family life if the defendants' meritless prosecutorial threats against him (which are also intended to inflict emotional injury on the other plaintiff family members) are carried out.

186. The activities of the defendants have continued from sometime before January 16, 2001 to the present, as a continuing wrong against each of the plaintiffs.

187. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. has suffered from these activities (including the defendants' arrest of his father, and the defendants' Platoon entering plaintiff's home, exercising dominion and control thereof as if they were storm troopers, and causing plaintiff X4xxxxxxxxx and his sister X4xxxxxxxxx to be falsely arrested and imprisoned for an hour or so) by severe emotional distress, inability to sleep, headaches, loss of days from school, unexplained illnesses and general malaise, and a sharp decline in the quality of his school work, grades and social relationships, and recently the additional traumatic event of learning that his sister, X3xxxxxxxxx, age 13, tried to commit suicide, because of the same activities of the defendants.

188. Plaintiff X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx has suffered from these activities (including the events experienced by her brother, X4xxxxxxxxx) by severe emotional distress, inability to sleep, headaches, loss of days from school, unexplained illnesses and general malaise, and a sharp decline in her social relationships, and during April, 2002, attempted to commit suicide, because of the same activities of the defendants, and was hospitalized and is now convalescing from this traumatic event. Also, see Paragraphs 29, 74, 122 and 187 above.

189. These activities by defendants were intentional, to create pressure on Dxxxxxxxxx's family to require Dxxxxxxxxx to accept a plea of guilty, turn over substantially all of his attached property to the defendants for their personal and unlawful use (the main objective of defendants), and serve time in jail (for defendants to show the world who cares that they have achieved "justice" in their unlawful persecution of plaintiffs).

190. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

191. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants in the amount of $10,000,000 or such higher amount as may be determined by the trier of fact.

192. The activities of each of the defendants was willful, wanton, outrageous, morally depraved, in violation of various statutes and constitutions affording protection from public officials, and in violation of the public trust.

193. Each of the plaintiffs is entitled to punitive damages against each of the defendants, in the amount of $10,000,000 or more as against DA1xxxxxxxxx, and in the amount of $1,000,000 or more as against each of the other defendants, as determined by the trier of fact.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Injury - Alternative Pleading

(Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. - against All Defendants)

194. Plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx, X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx, X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, and X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. (hereinafter, in this Count 14, the "plaintiffs") repeat and reallege each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-193 above, and particularly the allegations in the preceding count, and further allege that the activities of the defendants amount to a negligent infliction of emotional injury on each of the plaintiffs, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx. [Note: This Count 14 is pleaded in the alternative to Count 13 above.]

195. As alternative to the intent alleged in the preceding count, plaintiffs allege that the defendants' activities were a negligent infliction of emotional injury as distinguished from an intentional infliction of emotional injury, as to plaintiffs (X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, Jr. and X3xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx) and negligent as to plaintiffs X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx, X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx and X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx.

196. Plaintiff X1xxxxxxxxx Dxxxxxxxxx has suffered from these activities by severe emotional distress, attack of angina pectoris (coronary insufficiency), inability to sleep, headaches, excessive worry about financial matters, loss of days from employment, unexplained illnesses and general malaise, and the trauma of seeing each of the other members of immediate family adversely affected by such activities (including the events described in Paragraphs 187-188 above, and other emotional injury to other members of his family as described below. Also, Dxxxxxxxxx has suffered by reason of his awareness that the activities of defendants directed against the other members of his family are storm-trooper tactics which this country supposedly does not countenance, designed to and which did create emotional trauma upon Dxxxxxxxxx because of the defendants' repeated insistence that Dxxxxxxxxx give up his property and liberty in order that his family may have a relaxation of defendants' storm-trooper tactics and their effects.

197. Plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx has suffered from these activities by severe emotional distress, inability to sleep, headaches, excessive worry about financial matters, loss of days from employment, unexplained illnesses and general malaise, and the trauma of seeing each of the other members of the immediate family adversely affected by such activities (including the witnessing of the events which were taking place with her husband and children, as alleged in Paragraphs 187-188 and 196 above) and other emotional injury to other members of his family as described below.

198. Plaintiff X4xxxxxxxxx B. Dxxxxxxxxx has suffered from these activities by severe emotional distress, increased number and intensity of anxiety attacks with medication and professional therapy; nextended attachment of her assets even though she was not involved in any of the alleged activities, inability to sleep, headaches, excessive worry about financial matters, loss of days from employment, unexplained illnesses and general malaise, and the trauma of seeing each of the other members of her immediate family adversely affected by such activities (including the witnessing of the events which were taking place with her parents and siblings, as alleged in Paragraphs 187-188 and 196 above) and emotional injury to members of her family as described above.

199. The activities alleged are state action, performed under color of law.

Damages; Punitive Damages

200. Each of the plaintiffs has been damaged by the activities of the defendants in the amount of $10,000,000 or such higher amount as may be determined by the trier of fact.

201. The underlying activities of each of the defendants was [sic] willful, wanton, outrageous, morally depraved, in violation of various statutes and constitutions affording protection from public officials, and in violation of the public trust, even though the resulting infliction of emotional injury on plaintiffs was negligent (alleged in the alternative).

202. Each of the plaintiffs is entitled to punitive damages against each of the defendants, in the amount of $10,000,000 or more as against DA1xxxxxxxxx, and in the amount of $1,000,000 or more as against each of the other defendants, as determined by the trier of fact.

Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Comparable New York Law - Unlawful Prosecutorial Extortion Business of Suffolk County District Attorney's Office

(Plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx - against All Defendants)

203. Plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx (hereinafter, in this Count 15, "X2xxxxxxxxx" or the "plaintiff") repeats and realleges each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-202 above and further alleges that the activities of the defendants amount to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and comparable New York law as an infringement of plaintiff's 5th Amendment right to Due Process; 14th Amendment right to Equal Protection of Laws; 6th Amendment right to a Fair Trial, violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1951 (the "Hobbs Act", obtaining property through extortion under color of official right) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1981 (denial of Equal Rights under Law) and related prosecutorial abuse, by each of the Prosecutor Defendants, and with liability as actor and co-conspirator as to defendant XWxxxxxxxxx.

204. The Prosecutor Defendants always knew that X2xxxxxxxxx was not an actor in any of the activities charged against Dxxxxxxxxx.

205. They knew this from the complainants who had no dealings with X2xxxxxxxxx (which is why X2xxxxxxxxx was named as a non-criminal defendant in the attachment proceeding) and from the subpoenaed records which showed that X2xxxxxxxxx had no involvement in the business.

206. The subpoenaed records, however, showed the property-driven prosecutors that the only real estate held by any of the plaintiffs was the Plaintiffs' House, which had been purchased by X2xxxxxxxxx (with money provided to her by her parents) two years prior to any of the allegedly illegal activities charged against the Accused Plaintiffs.

207. Defendants changed their categorization of X2xxxxxxxxx after learning these facts, and named her in the March 5, 2001 indictment, for the purpose of having an alleged basis for causing a forfeiture of the Plaintiffs' House under the attachment proceeding (which otherwise would not be available for forfeiture if X2xxxxxxxxx was not a defendant and convicted); and to put unlawful, coercive pressure on Dxxxxxxxxx, to coerce him into pleading guilty without justification; and to put unlawful coercive pressure on Dxxxxxxxxx to plead guilty to be able to avoid the possibility of having the Plaintiffs House and home forfeited.

208. On April 15, 2002, defendants, pursuant to their unlawful scheme, offered X2xxxxxxxxx the opportunity of taking a guilty plea for "disorderly conduct" (an "offense" as distinguished from a felony or misdemeanor) in exchange for the equity in Plaintiffs' House, which in substance is an $800,000 fine (in the form of a lien on the house) for disorderly conduct.

209. The activities alleged are state action.

210. These activities by the Prosecutor Defendants, without lawful justification, amount to serious crimes of extortion, coercion and extreme prosecutorial abuse, and infringements and violations of the various constitutional provisions and statutes referred to in Paragraph 203 above.

Damages; Punitive Damages; Injunctive Relief

211. The plaintiff is being threatened with irrparable injury by reason of the threatened loss of her house, home, and threat of continued criminal prosecution solely because such prosecution makes it easier, in defendants' estimation, to confiscate her home, without justification; and the continuation of the emotional injury being suffered by her directly by reason of what the defendants are doing to her, and the emotional suffering of the plaintiff by reason of the impact and suffering on the members of plaintiff's family.

212. The plaintiff has been damaged by the activities of the defendants, in the amount of $5,000,000 or more, as will be proved with certainty at the time of trial.

213. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as alleged in Paragraphs 101-102 above.

214. Each of the defendants was motivated by evil motive and intent, with callous indifference to the federally-protected rights of plaintiff and others, and defendants acted willfully, wantonly, egregiously, with reckless abandon and high degree of moral culpability, and with near or actual criminal indifference to the laws of the United States and New York, as the way in which defendants conduct their prosecution business in Suffolk County, for which each of the defendants is liable to plaintiff X2xxxxxxxxx D. Dxxxxxxxxx for punitive damages in an amount of $10,000,000 or more, to be set by the trier of fact.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that a judgment and decree be entered against each of the defendants:

1. Adjudging or decreeing that each of the defendants acted unlawfully as alleged respectively in Counts 1-15 above, and that each of the respective plaintiffs as to such Counts was injured as alleged;

2. Awarding each of the plaintiffs against each of the defendants in Count 2 a declaratory judgment that the Forfeiture Statute, CPLR 1310-1352 is facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional in its application to plaintiffs;

3. Awarding each of the plaintiffs the damages alleged as against each of the defendants, jointly and severally, in Counts 1 and 3-15;

4. Awarding an injunction in favor of each of the plaintiffs against each of the defendants in Counts 1 and 3-7 and 15;

5. Awarding each of the plaintiffs punitive damages against each of the defendants, jointly and severally, as to Counts 1, and 3-15, in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact;

6. Awarding each of the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees against each of the defendants, jointly and severally;

7. Awarding each of the plaintiffs pre-judgment interest as appropriate and post-judgment interest;

8. Awarding each of the plaintiffs their costs against each of the defendants; and

9. Awarding each of the plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

[a date processing file for Exhibit B is not yet available]

[a date processing file for Exhibit C is not yet available]